Abstract. This paper retakes previous work of the authors, about the relationship between non-quasi-competitiveness (the increase in price caused by an increase in the number of oligopolists) and stability of the equilibrium in the classical Cournot oligopoly model. Though it has been widely accepted in the literature that the loss of quasi-competitiveness is linked, in the long run as new firms entered the market, to instability of the model, the authors in their previous work put forward a model in which a situation of monopoly changed to duopoly losing quasi-competitiveness but maintaining the stability of the equilibrium. That model could not, at the time, be extended to any number of oligopolists. The present paper exhibits such an extension. An oligopoly model is shown in which the loss of quasi-competitiveness resists the presence in the market of as many firms as one wishes and where the successive Cournot's equilibrium points are unique and asymptotically stable. In this way, for the first time, the conjecture that non-quasi-competitiveness and instability were equivalent in the long run, is proved false.
Introduction
The classic model of Cournot's oligopoly raises four kind of issues in the literature: the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium, the stability of such an equilibrium, the quasi-competitiveness of the model and, lastly, perfect competition in the limit as the number of oligopolists increase. Under diverse general assumptions, the four questions have been taken care of. Stability was first considered in Teocharis (1959-60) , where it was proved that Cournot's equilibrium solution was stable if there are two sellers, oscillatory if the number of sellers is three and unstable if the number is greater than three. These results were immediately "corrected and appraised" in McManus and Quandt (1961) where it was shown that Teocharis' results are very restrictive as they depend profoundly on the adjustment system chosen. Besides, in Teocharis' paper, a discrete approach is used and the dynamics are those of a system of difference equations; thus the stability depends strongly on the coefficients. McManus and Quandt (1961) considered a continuous adjustment system where each firm changes its production proportionally to the difference between profit maximizing production and actual production:
(1)q i = K i (q * i − q i ).
(The K i (> 0) are considered the 'speeds' of the adjustment.) Under this adjustment system, the model is stable no matter the number of firms in the industry and no matter the values (positive) of the speeds of the adjustment. At the same time, Fisher (1961) analyzed also Teocharis' adjustment system and arrived at the same conclusions that McManus and Quandt. Fisher commented that despite his result, "the tendency to instability does rise with the number of sellers". Shortly after that, Hahn (1962) undertook the question of the stability and found a sufficient condition to establish it under the continuous adjustment system (1) of McManus and Fisher. Hahn's condition is general enough to be widely applicable. In short it says that if demand (d) and cost (C i ) are continuous and several times differentiable and conditions (2) are met, Cournot equilibrium, when it exists and is unique, is stable.
(ii) d(0) > C i (0) (iii) The profit function for each firm is concave throughout.
) < 0 where q * and q i * are, respectively, total production and firm i's production at equilibrium. Hahn's conditions were generalized in Okuguchi (1964) who proved they were valid even if the adjustment system were not linear but simply a sign-preserving function with respect to the difference between profit maximizing production and actual one. The existence of Cournot equilibrium has been proved under very varied conditions. Perhaps Frank Jr. and Quandt (1963) is the most common reference (though under more restrictive assumptions it had already been proved, see McManus (1962) ). A more recent (and more general) proof is Novshek (1985) and also Szidarovszky and Yakowitz (1982) . Uniqueness is more difficult to prove and there are less references. We cite Ruffin (1971) , Okuguchi and Suzumura (1971) Szidarovszky and Yakowitz (1982) and Schlee (1993) . Okuguchi and Suzumura (1971) link uniqueness of the equilibrium with Hahn's condition proving that this last condition implies not only stability but also the uniqueness of the Cournot solution. Quasi-competitiveness is at the heart of Cournot model. In fact, the mathematical model was expected to confirm the general opinion that competition lowers prices. This was not the case : Frank Jr. and Quandt (1963) , besides proving the existence of equilibrium, present an example of passage from monopoly to duopoly in which quasicompetitiveness is lost. A little later, conditions to ensure quasicompetitiveness are found in Frank Jr. (1965) . Later, these conditions were thoroughly investigated: Ruffin (1971) , Okuguchi (1974) and Szidarovszky and Yakowitz (1982) . It is worth mentioning that Ruffin (1971) , addresses the four issues mentioned about Cournot's model. Ruffin points out that Hahn's condition ensures not only stability but also quasi-competitiveness and shows an example in which quasi-competitiveness and stability break down with large numbers of firms in the market. These two facts gave rise to the conjecture that quasi-competitiveness and stability are, if not equivalent, very closely related. Summing up, when an equilibrium exists, Hahn's condition implies uniqueness of the equilibrium, stability and quasi-competitiveness. The question of convergence to perfect competition is dealt with in Frank Jr. (1965) or McManus (1962) . The former attempted to prove that quasi-competitiveness was sufficient for convergence and the latter, questioned the relationship between these two issues. Later Ruffin (1971) detaches the question of convergence to perfect competition from quasi-competitiveness and proves that the former issue is only related to the convexity of the cost function. Other authors worth reviewing are Ushio (1983) and Amir and Lambson (2000) . The models dealt with by these authors vary slightly in their assumptions concerning demand and cost functions: some require differentiability, others only continuity or even semi-continuity. Others consider increasing marginal costs, others not. Some consider all the firms identical and others consider different costs for each firm, etc. A very good summary of these results can be found in Okuguchi (1976) and, from a more general point of view, Daughety (1988) . A good reference for the generalization to multi-product firms can be found in Okuguchi and Szidarovsky (1999) . The present state of the art can be found in Okuguchi and Szidarovsky (1999) or Vives (2000) . In our previous work, Villanova et al. (2001) , we built a model in which the passage from monopoly to duopoly caused, at equilibrium, a loss of quasi-competitiveness keeping at the same time the stability of the equilibrium. Obviously, the conditions of our model, though general enough, did not go against the known results in this area. The main feature of our model was an increasing two-piece linear cost function which was concave throughout. Concavity was necessary as the convexity of the cost function causes directly the quasi-competitiveness of the model as has been shown in several occasions (see (Szidarovszky and Yakowitz (1982) who prove quasi-competitiveness assuming strictly convex cost functions). This result of ours separated clearly the issue of quasi-competitiveness from the stability of the equilibrium in a duopoly. The results could not be extended to an r-poly maintaining the characteristics of the model. In this paper, we change slightly the model to extend our results to an r-poly, where r is any given number of firms. We prove that an oligopoly equilibrium (unique) may be non-quasi-competitive and, at the same time, be stable under the adjustment system (1). Besides, under a concave cost function, we prove that as r increases, marginal cost and market price tend to be equal which means perfect competition in the limit. We build a model in which, starting from any linear decreasing inverse demand function we find an increasing piece-wise linear cost function with an infinite number of pieces such that the model has the unique following features:
(1) A unique Cournot equilibrium point exists for any number of firms. (2) Industry price increases with the number of firms in the market; that is to say, if p i denotes price at equilibrium when there are i firms competing in the market, p 1 < p 2 < · · · < p r < · · · . (3) The successive equilibria are asymptotically stable. (4) The oligopoly is viable no matter the number of firms in the market, that is to say, at equilibrium, profit for an individual firm is always positive. (5) The model converges to perfect competition as the number of firms tends to infinity; or, what amounts to the same, industry price p r tends to marginal cost under perfect competition, which coincides with limiting marginal cost as output tends to zero.
In section 2, after building the basic functions (demand and cost) of our model in a very abstract way, we discuss the reaction curve and the necessary assumptions required to achieve our results. We find the different Cournot points of our model. In section 3, we use the parameters obtained in the previous section to determine completely the cost function of our model. In section 4 we prove the existence and uniqueness of a Cournot solution and, in sections 5 and 6 we prove the loss of quasi-competitiveness and study the asymptotic stability of the different equilibria under (1). The convergence to perfect competition is dealt with in section 7. Lastly, in section 8 we exhibit a numerical example of our model and the Appendix collects some of the proofs of various sections.
The model
Let p = a − b q, (a, b > 0) be an inverse linear demand function for the industry of a homogeneous commodity. The function is defined on the
We also consider a concave continuous piecewise linear cost function:
As we require the continuity of the cost function at each q = t i ,
We will also impose c i → 0 and, in this way, ensure positive profit no matter how small is the level of production. See Figure 1a .
As we have already mentioned in the introduction, the concavity of our cost function is necessary in order to achieve our goal as for linear demand and a convex cost function, the classical Cournot model is quasi-competitive.
We assume that a fixed number of firms, r, (r ≥ 1), have (3) as their cost function, and the industry has p = a − b q as inverse demand function.
Under these assumptions, the profit function of firm k (k = 1, . . . , r) is
Ifq k denotes the production of the whole industry except for firm k:
function (5) can be written as
Displaying the different values of C(q k ) and rearranging somewhat the result, we have (7)
Notice that the last interval ends at a/b for this is the production that makes price become zero.
For our purposes it will be convenient to modify the way of presenting function (7). Let us define q c i as
We can now write expression (7) as (9) As usual in Cournot's model, each firm will maximize its own profit considering the production of the rest of the market,q k , constant. In our model, givenq k the profit function is not concave throughout [0, a/b]. It consists of an infinite number of parabolas, each one defined on the corresponding interval
The vertex of this parabola is found at
Let us 
The graph of Π k,i in each one of the previous situations is shown in Figure 2 .
Thus the value (or values) of q k that maximize Π k (q) depend onq k through the corresponding reaction curve R k :
. . .
The inequalities above, in terms ofq k , are equivalent to:
Thus, a different way of writing (11) is
This reaction curve, R k (q k ), is in fact a multivalued function or correspondence on the variableq k (see Figurs 3a and 3b) . Among all the possible values of R k (q k ) for a givenq k , firm k will choose, asq k 's image, the value (or one of the values) that maximizes its profit. In order to determine the reaction function in our model we will impose a condition on the y-ordinates of the vertexes of the infinity of parabolas that, given a fixedq k constitute Π k :
What values mustq k attain for that to be possible? Inequality (14) leads to:
and replacing the difference of squares as sum times difference and using relations (4) we get:
). This last expression can be simplified using the relationship between d i and q c i from equation (10). We get (17) 2b(q
We denote the right hand side of equation (18) 
.).
Consequently we can state the following:
The following lemma is a direct consequence of the previous one:
Lemma 2. If we can find a sequence of q h i satisfying definition (19) and verifying 0 < q
For the time being, let us suppose we have the increasing sequence of q h i needed in Lemma 2. We are now prepared for choosing firm k's reaction among the different set of values R k (q k ).
and the situation of Π k,i on interval [t i , t i−1 ) is exactly situation (i) as described in Figure 2 . The situation in any interval on the left of [t i , t i−1 ), say [t i+m , t i+m−1 ), is either (i) or (ii) as described in Figure  2 ; lastly, the situation of any interval on the right of [t i , t i−1 ), say 
Consequently, situation (iii) in Figure 2 is ruled out, and as As before, situation (ii) in Figure 2 is ruled out, and as V i ≥ V i−m and
). The reaction function we finally get is:
(see Figure 1 c ).
2.1. Cournot equilibrium points. Given the r reaction functions (20) we will call potential Cournot points the intersections that can be eventually found without taking into consideration the constraints given by the q
There are an infinity of such points. Among the potential intersections, those that satisfy the constraints will be called the actual Cournot points.
If we choose r indexes among {1, 2, . . .}, i 1 , i 2 , . . . , i r , the general solution of the system formed by the r equations chosen (see Appendix I) is: 
Determination of the cost function
Let us keep in mind that our purpose is to build a non-quasicompetitive model. The demand function is given and known; we are now going to determine those values of the parameters used so far, q c i , c i , d i and t i in such way that our goal is achieved. In the first place we will determine the q c i and the t i . From them, we will find c i and d i using (8) and (4) and the assumption that lim c i = 0. The q c i are a decreasing sequence, see (10). We are going to define them recursively from the first one, q c 1 . Definition 1. For j = 1, 2 . . .,
where δ ∈ (0, 2/3). In Appendix I we check the monotony of the q c j sequence. Definition 3. For j = 1, 2, . . .,
where δ is as before and 0 < β < 1 − 3 2 3 + δ 3 + 2 δ δ.
In Appendix I we check the monotony of the t j . We are now prepared to prove the following Lemma which will be needed in the sequel: (19) and (23):
as by (23) 
Adding these last equations for i = 1, 2, . . . , n we get
If we impose that c n → 0 we must have 
using now expression (48) from Appendix I for t i , we finally have
This series is obviously convergent and its sum can be obtained with the help of hypergeometric series,
where Ψ(n, x) is the n-th polygamma function, i.e., the n-th derivative of the logarithmic derivative of Γ(x), see Lebedev (1972) .
Existence and uniqueness of equilibrium
We are now prepared to tackle the first of our aims: the existence and uniqueness of Cournot's equilibrium no matter the number of oligopolists in the industry. Proof. The idea behind the proof is to see that among the potential solutions to (21), only the symmetric one obtained for the system when the r equations are i 1 = i 2 = · · · = i r = r is an actual solution. Let us recall that "actual" solutions are those that satisfy all the constraints given by the q
r).
To begin with, we treat the monopoly case separately for reasons that will be clear in the sequel. Let us suppose then that r = 1. (21), which is in this case
From solution (30) we have that for firm k, (k = 1, . . . , r),
As our solution must verify the necessary constraints, we must have q h i−1 ≤q k < q h i , which using (25) and (26) can be written as
The double inequality is obviously true for i = r, for any r ≥ 2. We are now going to prove that in case i > r the left inequality fails to be true and if i < r, the right one is untrue. As the expression in the left hand side of the first inequality increases with i, it will suffice to prove that the inequality is not true for i = r +1 and our assertion will follow. In this case, replacing i = r + 1 we have:
But (r − 1 + δ)/(r + 1) increases with r which means that its value is always greater than the value obtained for r = 2,
The contradiction between (33) and (34) prove that i ≤ r. Let us now consider the second inequality in (32). The right hand expression increases again with i; we will thus prove our assertion if the inequality fails for i = r − 1, the greatest possible value of i less than r. Replacing i = r − 1, we have
from which we obtain 2 r + 1 < (1 − β)δ r − 1 + δ and (35) r − 1 + δ r + 1
But from (34) we have
The contradiction between (35) and (36) proves that i ≥ r. We conclude that i = r as we contented.
The previous argument cannot be applied when r = 1 because for this value of r some of the expressions that are increasing with i fail to be so. Lastly, we are going to prove that if not all of the i 1 , i 2 , . . . , i r are equal, there are no actual solutions of system (21). Let us assume then that i 1 ≤ i 2 ≤ · · · ≤ i r and i 1 < i r . We recall that the constraints of system (21) require
Now, from (21), we have
and (37) can be written as
It is obvious now that if we manage to establish that
it will be impossible to satisfy neither (38) nor (37).
To simplify notation and make the checking of (39) easier, we call i 1 = i,
. With this notation (39) becomes:
Changing sides, Using (23), (25) and (26) we have
This last expression decreases with i and with d. Thus, in order to verify (41) for d ≥ 1 it suffices to verify it for d = 1. The left hand side of (41) becomes for d = 1 :
and the right hand side,
Now, replacing the corresponding values in (41) and simplifying:
or, equivalently,
, which can be written
Rearranging,
The condition 0 < δ < 2/3 ensures the positivity of the right hand side of last inequality. Now, as we want (43) to be true for i ≥ 2, dividing through by 2δ we get
2δ this last inequality being equivalent to β < 1 − 3 2 δ 3 + δ 3 + 2δ which is the condition we have demanded our β to verify all the time.
The loss of quasi-competitiveness
Theorem 2. Under the same conditions as before, the oligopoly equilibrium reached is not quasi-competitive, that is to say, when a new firm enters the market and a new equilibrium is reached, the new market price is greater than the old one.
Proof. Let us call Q r the total production when there are r firms in the market under equilibrium. We are going to prove that, for r = 1, 2, . . . we have Q r > Q r+1 . From (29) we have
Using (22) we have
and replacing this in the previous expression for Q r+1 we get
Consequently,
as we suppose δ ∈ (0, 2/3).
6. The stability of the successive equilibria
We will study the stability of our model assuming that each firm adjusts its output proportionally with the difference between its actual profit and its profit maximizing output:
where the k i > 0(i = 1, 2, . . . , r) are the speeds of adjustment. Let us reorder the firms according to their speeds of adjustment and consider that k 1 ≤ k 2 ≤ · · · ≤ k r . Using our reaction function (20) the system of r differential equations (44) Let us recall that this equilibrium comes from solving system (49) which required that for k = 1, 2, . . . , r, q
Theorem 3. The equilibrium (q t , . . . ,q r ) is globally stable in the compact set of R r defined by:
Proof. The general solution of system (45) is given by the vector q(t):
where the D i,j are constants and the −α j are the eigenvalues of the matrix of the system,
Now, the eigenvalues of the last matrix above are all real and positive. This can be seen just considering the characteristic polynomial, (46) P
and noticing that P (0) = (r + 1)k 1 k 2 · · · k r > 0 and
we have that the signs of the sequence P (k 1 ), P (k 2 ), . . . , P (k r ), P (∞) are alternated. This fact guarantees that the r roots of P (x) are one in each interval (k 1 , k 2 ), . . . , (k r−1 , k r ), (k r , ∞). If consecutive k i 's are equal, k i itself becomes a root of multiplicity −1, which can be seen differentiating times P (x) from its determinant form, (46) and the rest of the roots remain in the same intervals as before. Consequently, the α j > 0 for j = 1, . . . , r. This proves that the stationary solution of our system is globally stable in S.
Perfect competition as r tends to infinity.
Its is now a simple exercise to determine the behaviour of price and marginal cost as r → ∞. Total industry production is
which obviously tends to δq c 1 as r → ∞. Thus, as r → ∞, price p(Q r ) = a − bQ r → a − bδq Besides, the oligopoly is always viable no matter the number of firms in the market, as equilibrium profits are always an eventually decreasing sequence (see Lemma 2) and its limit is obviously zero. This implies, consequently, that profit is positive. This result proves that convexity of the cost function is a sufficient condition for perfect competition in the limit, but not necessary, completing Ruffin's results on the subject, Ruffin (1971) .
A numerical example
We will finish with an example. Let the inverse demand function be (47) p = 100 − 2q (0 ≤ q ≤ 50).
According to section 3 we must, first of all, choose q c 1 < 25. Let q c 1 = 24. We must now fix δ ∈ (0, 2/3). Let δ = 1/3; β must satisfy 0 < β < 1 − 3δ(3 + δ)2 −1/2 (3 + 2δ) −1/2 . For δ = 1/3, β < 6/11. Thus we choose β = 1/2. Now we find q c 2 , q c 3 , . . . , using (22) 
If we then find out c 1 using formula (28), we obtain c 1 = 960. The rest of the c i are obtained using (4):
Our cost function is: The profit function under monopoly would be: Figure 4 . Under 5-poly, the profit function for any of the five firms, k = 1, 2, . . . , 5, would be
Differentiating with respect to q k , equating to zero and imposing symmetry on the solutions (q k = q k ), we have one potential symmetric Cournot point: (1.85, 1.85, . . . , 1.85) We must have in mind that this solution corresponds to a particular intersection of the reaction functions F 1 (q 1 ), F 2 (q 2 ), . . . , F 5 (q 5 ). The q . Now, the equilibrium point found corresponds tô q k = 4 × 1.85 = 7.4 which is found, as predicted, within the 5-th piece of the reaction function. The total production in this case is 9.25 and the market price is 81.5. We can proceed similarly with other entries. The table below summarizes the results obtained. In case of an r-poly, when r → ∞, the market output, Q r , tends to δq c 1 which is 8 in our case. This establishes the price p = 84. This is the perfect competition price that coincides with the marginal cost at q = 0: C (0) = lim r→∞ d r = 84.
APPENDIX I
Monotony of q The expression between parenthesis is clearly decreasing with j.
Cournot points of the model
Proof. Given the r reaction functions (20): 
